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INTRODUCTION

In a term that included cases about witness identification testimony,' the applicability of the Confrontation Clause to expert
testimony, 2 and imposing mandatory life-without-parole sentences
on juveniles,3 many criminal justice advocates heralded Lafler v.
Cooper4 and Missouriv. Frye5 as game changers. A policy advisor for
the Brennan Center for Justice described Lafler and Frye as "the
term's decisions with the greatest, everyday impact on the criminal
justice system."6 Professor Wesley Oliver called the two cases "the
single greatest revolution in the criminal process since Gideon v.
Wainwright provided indigents the right to counsel."7 Professor
Ronald Wright added, "I can't think of another decision that's had
any bigger impact than these two are going to have over the next
few years."' The press, too, praised the decisions. The New York
Times applauded the decisions for "vastly expand[ing] judges' supervision of the criminal justice system."9 Even detractors recognized
the cases' impact. Justice Scalia, writing for the dissent in both
cases, lamented that the cases would open "a whole new boutique of
constitutional jurisprudence (plea-bargaining law)."1° Given this response, it is not surprising that Lafler and Frye have generated
extensive scholarly consideration. The Yale Law Journaldevoted a
series of essays in its online forum to the impact of the decisions, 1
1. See Perry v, New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 723 (2012).
2. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2227 (2012).
3. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
4. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
5. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
6. Sidney S. Rosdeitcher, Plea Bargaining and Effective Assistance of Counsel After
Lafler and Frye, BRENNAN CTR.FOR JUST. (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.brennancenter.org/
analysis/plea-bargaining-and-effective-assistance-counsel-after-lafler-and-frye [https://perma.
cc/N55N-GVCV].
7. Adam Liptak, Justices' Ruling Expands Rights of Accused in Plea Bargains, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 21,2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/22/us/supreme-court-says-defendantshave-right-to-good-lawyers.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/CW4V-8ZLN].
8. Erika Goode, Stronger Hand for Judges in the "Bazaar"of Plea Deals, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 22,2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/stronger.hand-for-judges-after-rulings
-on-plea-deals.html?_ r=0 [https://perma.cc/FN5F-PJ37].
9. Liptak, supra note 7.
10. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11. See 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE (2012).
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and the Duquesne Law Review devoted a print issue to the cases.12
And of course, there is this William & Mary Law Review Symposium.
The primary goal of this Article is not to weigh in on the significance of Lafler and Frye, or to question the attention they have
received, although the Article does a little of both. Rather, the primary goal is to shift the focus somewhat. Lafler and Frye certainly
signal increased attention to the regulation of defense counsel in
criminal cases, as did an earlier case, Padilla v. Kentucky." But
what about prosecutors? For the most part, prosecutors remain underexamined and underregulated. Put differently, the problem
brought to the fore in Lafler and Frye-the failure of defense counsel
to properly advise their clients of plea offers-is not the only problem in this new, old world of negotiated pleas. With Lafler and Frye,
there will now be more judicial oversight of defense counsel when it
comes to plea negotiations. But ifjudges are watching defense counsel, who is watching prosecutors?
This Article argues for more regulation of prosecutors during the
plea bargaining stage. Part I begins by first offering some modest
criticisms of Lafler and Frye, with particular attention paid to possible collateral consequences. Part II turns the attention to prosecutors, who are notoriously underregulated, and to the outsized role
they play in plea negotiations. Part III suggests that the next goal
of "plea bargaining" law should be to remedy this lack of oversight
and offers the Due Process Clause, and to a lesser extent internal
and external regulation, as one possible route for getting there.
I. LAFLER/FRYE

The conventional wisdom is that Lafler and Frye broke new
ground.' 4 Of course, the Court had long ago read the Sixth Amend12. See 51 DUQ. L. REv. 533, 533-859 (2013).
13. See 559 U.S. 356, 359 (2010) (holding that failure of counsel to advise client of
collateral immigration consequences of plea constituted ineffective assistance).
14. For a rare contrary view, see Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small BandAids for a Festering Wound, 51 DuQ. L. REV. 673, 679-80 (2013) (observing that eleven federal
courts of appeals and most states had already reached similar decisions); Gerard E. Lynch,
Frye and Lafler: No Big Deal, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 39, 41 (2012), http:I/www.yalelawjournal.
org/forum/frye-and-lafler-no-big-deal [https://perma.cc/AY8P-EJCQ].
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ment, despite its seeming emphasis on rights at trial, as extending
the right to the assistance of counsel beyond trial to plea negotiations. As the Court observed in United States v. Wade, the right to
assistance of counsel extends to "any stage of the prosecution,
formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might
derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial.""I That assistance
has to be effective, the Court made clear in Strickland v. Washington, 6 and thus it followed quite naturally that the right to effective
assistance would extend to plea negotiations, as the Court held in
Hill v. Lockhart 7 and Padillav. Kentucky.'" However, both Hill and
Padillainvolved the issue of whether the defendants were denied
effective assistance of counsel when counsels' faulty advice caused
them to accept a plea. It was held ineffective. The next step of Lafler
and Frye was applying this requirement to situations in which counsels' advice caused defendants to reject a plea. Though this was new
ground, the takeaway from Lafler and Frye is essentially straightforward: effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations
includes timely communicating plea offers to the client and effectively advising the client about the merits vel non of accepting the
plea offer.
New ground, though not quite terrafirma. Indeed, much has been
made of Lafler and Frye and the complications that will ensue with
respect to proving the making and communication of offers, and
with respect to fashioning remedies. The Court essentially punted
on these issues, leaving lower courts to figure out fact-finding and
to fashion appropriate remedies.' 9 But the bigger story, beyond
these complications, is the Court's acknowledgement of the reality
that scholars have long observed2": given that approximately 97

15. 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967).
16. See 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).
17. See 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).
18. See 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010) ("[Ihe negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase
of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.").
19. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (2012) ("Today's decision leaves open to the
trial court how best to exercise that discretion [regarding remedy] in all the circumstances of
the case.").
20. See Lynch, supra note 14, at 39-40 (citing Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative
System of CriminalJustice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998)); Robert E. Scott & William J.
Stuntz, PleaBargainingas Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992).
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percent of cases are disposed of by plea,2 1 the Court acknowledged
that plea bargaining "is the criminal justice system."2 2 And more significant still by several multiples is this: the Court moved to provide
more constitutional oversight to the 97 percent of the criminal justice system that, for the most part, had remained in the shadows.
Perhaps it is too early to know what long-term effect the two
decisions will have on the ground and in the trenches. According to
at least one practitioner, there has already been an increase in
"Lafler claims" alleging ineffective assistance during plea negotiations.23 In some jurisdictions, prosecutors have requested in-court
plea colloquies to memorialize the communication of plea offers on
the record.2 4 Even in the absence of colloquies, some prosecutors are
still hoping to make a factual record. At least one District Attorney's
Office has announced that it will make a practice of announcing on
the record in the defendant's presence the making of plea offers and
any rejection of the same.25
But beyond this, it is too early to know what effects, especially
collateral effects, Lafler and Frye will have. Indeed, precisely because it is early, it is useful to repeat some concerns already raised
by other scholars and to surface additional concerns. First, allow me
to second the concern Judge Jed Rakoff of the Southern District of
New York raised about the likely perverse effect of Lafler and Frye.
Judge Rakoff writes:
Frye and Lafler could push defense attorneys toward urging
their clients to take the first plea offered, even if counsel felt
there was a realistic chance that a better deal might later be
21. Lynch, supra note 14, at 39. As an evidence teacher and scholar, I cannot help but
wonder if the decline in evidence scholarship-in quantity, not quality-may be attributable
to the fact that evidence rules-which are really rules for trial--do not have the same impact
on outcomes as they once did.
22. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).
23. Timothy E. Warriner, The Supreme Court's Decisions in Lafler and Frye, LAW OFF.
TIMOTHYE.WARRINER, http://www.warrinerlaw.com/articles/the-consequences-of-the-supremecourts-decisions-in-lafler-and-frye-ineffective-assistance-of-counsel-in-plea-negotiation/
[https://perma.cc/P9AG-XZHD] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016),
24. See Maranda E. Fritz & Gabrielle Y. Vazquez, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Plea
Negotiations After Lafler, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=
[https://
1202670910273/Effective-Assistance-of-Counsel-in-Plea-Negotiations-After-Lafler
perma.cc/RWV7-WH65]; Warriner, supra note 23.
25. See Warriner, supra note 23.
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obtained; for otherwise, the defense attorney would risk facing
a charge of ineffectiveness of counsel if the later plea bargainor sentence after trial-proved more onerous than the initial
offer. But the corollary of this result is that both the prosecutor
and the defense counsel will be negotiating their deal at a time
when neither fully understands the strengths or weaknesses of
the case: a recipe for injustice.2 6
In short, rather than facilitating the "pursuit of perfect justice,"27
Lafler and Frye could instead frustrate that pursuit by indirectly
encouraging both the making of early pleas on the part of the
prosecutor (who will know that the defense lawyer will now be obligated to convey the early offer and even push for it or risk an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim), and the acceptance of early
pleas by defendants. Indeed, on the defense side, there may be a
double-whammy of risk aversion: the defendant who is afraid that
the plea offer will be withdrawn, and the defense attorney who is
afraid of being hit with an ineffective assistance claim. Again, a
recipe for injustice.2"
My concerns dovetail Judge Rakoff's and go a step further. The
critic in me wonders if Lafler and Frye are little more than a token
gesture, giving the outward appearance of judicial oversight, of
checks and balances, of real reform, and indeed of justice, while
really maintaining the status quo. The mere fact that I can already
imagine prosecutors applauding the decisions gives cause for some
concern. Consider the skepticism of Judge Gerald Lynch of the Second Circuit. As Judge Lynch points out, it is unlikely that Lafler and
Frye will result in many findings of ineffective assistance.29After all,
26. Jed S. Rakoff, Frye and Lafler: Bearers of Mixed Messages, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE
25,26 (2012)http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/frye-and-lafler-bearers-of-mixed-messages
[https://perma.cc/Q6LH-JBS5].
27. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28. Consider the process instituted in Georgia. There, judges conduct Lafler/Frye status
hearings in which the judge inquires into whether there has been a plea offer, its terms, and
the defendant's response. If the defendant rejects the offer at the hearing, the prosecution
usually immediately revokes the offer. The disadvantage of this process is that it can function
as a pressure point for forcing a plea. See Crawford & Boyle, LLC, Attorney Eric C. Crawford
Explains Lafler Frye Status Hearings (Georgia Criminal Law), YOuTUBE (July 26, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v--VW4h-5QKuo [https://perma.ccd84H5-H5HZ]; see also
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012).
29. See Lynch, supranote 14, at 41.
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the burden on the defendant claiming ineffective assistance is a
substantial one. 3' Albert Alschuler is even more critical, noting the
structural barriers that frustrate effective legal representationbarriers that Lafler and Frye leave untouched. 3' Rare is the type of
blatant malfeasance evidence available in Lafler and Frye; instead,
a court deciding a Lafler/Frye claim must engage in speculation
about would-haves and should-haves. In short, absent the kind of
"easy cases"" presented by Lafler and Frye, courts will continue to
take "a fairly hard line against after-the-fact criticism of anything
that can be characterized as a matter of tactical decision."3 3
And this is just the beginning of possible shortcomings. Lafler and
Frye will likely do very little to disrupt a system that is now parasitical on plea bargaining. It is beyond dispute that our current
system of criminal justice could not survive without pleas. 4 The
30. See id.; see, e.g., United States v. Frederick, 526 F. App'x. 91, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2013)
(holding that defendant did not provide sufficient evidence that he was prejudiced by his
counsel's ineffectiveness despite rejecting a 13.5- to 15-year sentence and receiving a 32-year
sentence); cf. Foster v. United States, 735 F.3d 561, 566-67 (7th Cir. 2013) (recognizing the
circuit rule that a defendant's "single, self-serving statement" is not enough to demonstrate
prejudice).
31. See Alschuler, supra note 14, at 681-82. Alschuler writes:
First, our plea-dominated system makes the kind of justice that a "defendant
receives more dependent on the quality of counsel than any other legal system
in the world." Second, this system "subjects defense attorneys to serious
temptations to disregard their clients' interests." And third, this system "makes
it impossible to determine whether defendants have received the effective
assistance of counsel."
Id. (quoting Albert W. Alschuler, Personal Failure,Institutional Failure, and the Sixth
Amendment, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 149, 156 (1986)).
32. Lynch, supra note 14, at 41; see also Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1412 (2012)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that in other cases, "it will not be so clear that counsel's
plea-bargaining skills, which must now meet a constitutional minimum, are adequate");
Rakoff, supra note 26, at 26 (describing Frye and Lafler as "rather easy cases").
33. Lynch, supra note 14, at 41; see also Alschuler, supra note 14, at 683-84. The rule
announced in Strickland v. Washingtonis similar, directing that "scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential" and that courts must make "every effort ... to eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight ... and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the
time." 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1983). For a discussion of how few ineffective assistance claims are
even granted review, see Nancy J. King, Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez, 122
YALE L.J. 2428, 2438-48 (2013).
34. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy observed that "[t]o note the prevalence of
plea bargaining is not to criticize it." Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407. One wishes he had criticized it,
or at least engaged in what it ultimately means to say that our criminal justice system "is for
the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials." Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388
(2012).
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Court acknowledged as much in Santobello v. New York, a 1971
decision.3" As the Court stated then:
The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the
prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called "plea
bargaining," is an essential component of the administration of
justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. If every
criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States
and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many
times the number of judges and court facilities.3 6
Of course, the reliance on pleas has only increased since then.
Furthermore, although it may seem a matter of little consequence
whether a defendant is convicted by a plea of guilty or by a jury of
his peers, it in fact matters a great deal. Evidence suggests that plea
bargaining sidesteps, rather than furthers, the truth-seeking function of justice.37 As Judge Rakoff writes, "[A] criminal justice system
operating largely behind closed doors is both inconsistent with the
traditions of a free society and an invitation for abuse."3
There are still other shortcomings, especially when one considers
the celebratory remarks that greeted the decisions. For instance, the
Court's recent decision in Burt v. Titlow would seem to further undermine the impact of Lafler and Frye, since it would seem to relieve
an attorney from advising her client about the merits vel non of a
plea when the client has always insisted upon his innocence. 9
Second, Lafler and Frye will do nothing to stem legislatures from
passing increasingly stiff maximum penalties. Indeed, the decisions
may in fact motivate legislatures to pass harsher statutory penalties because stiffer maximum penalties will discourage defendants
from taking a pass on early plea offers and make delaying acceptance of a plea offer that much more frightening.4" Beyond this,
35. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).

36. Id. at 260.
37. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trial and the Thirty Years War,
57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1272-74 (2005).

38. Rakoff, supra note 26, at 26.
39. See 134 S. Ct. 10, 17 (2013).
40. Cf. Alschuler, supra note 14, at 703 (observing that "[w]hen Congress creates new
crimes and increases sentences, it speaks, not of doing justice, but of giving 'tools' to prosecutors"); Rachel Barkow, Separationof Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989,
1034 (2006) (observing that "longer sentences exist on the books largely for bargaining
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Lafler and Frye will certainly do nothing to address the seemingly
intractable problem most criminal defendants face: unequal resources. As former Attorney General Eric Holder recently acknowledged, indigent defense systems "are in financial crisis, plagued by
crushing caseloads and insufficient resources.""' Lastly, Lafler and
Frye will likely do very little to address the bite noir of our criminal
justice system: over-incarceration.4 2 Indeed, it may even have a
perverse effect for many of the reasons already stated. To be clear,
no one has claimed that Lafler and Frye will be cure-alls. But the
praise the decisions received does seem overblown, premature, and
of a piece with "technocratic" thought-the thinking that legal
problems are essentially problems of technique.4" Again, when we
can imagine prosecutors applauding decisions that purport to give
defendants more rights, we should be concerned. Lafler and Frye
may signal that the Court is headed in the direction of real reform
of the criminal justice system. But in terms of distance, we are still
a long way off.
Beyond these shortcomings, there is another problem that is
equally weighty and has not received sufficient attention. Indeed,
Justice Scalia identified this problem in his dissent, although his
take and mine are quite different. In Justice Scalia's Lafler parade
of horribles,44 he wrote:
purposes"); Stephanos Bibas, Taming NegotiatedJustice, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 35, 36 (2012)
http://www.yalelawjournal.orglforumltaming-negotiated-justice [https://perma.cc/LAY9-JARJ];
Lynch, supra note 14, at 41; William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPoliticsof Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505, 523 (2001).
41. Eric H. Holder Jr., Defendants'LegalRights Undermined by Budget Cuts, WASH. POST
(Aug. 22,2013), http://www.washingtonpost.comlopinions/eric-holder-defendants-legalrightsundermined-by-budget-cuts/2013/08/22/efccbec8-06bc-1 le3-9259-e2aafe5a5f84_story.html
[https://perma.cc/N7MS-2DZL].
42. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 136 (2010).
43. See Donald Black, The Boundaries of Legal Sociology, 81 YALE L.J. 1086, 1090-91
(1972). Black writes:
[T]he sociology of law significantly resembles a broader style of thought that has
come to be known as technocratic thought.... In the technocratic world-view,
every problem-factual, moral, political, or legal-reduces to a question of technique. A good technique is one that works, and what works can be learned
through science. Any problem that cannot be solved in this way is no problem at
all, hardly worthy of our attention. In theory, moreover, every problem can be
solved if only the appropriate expertise is applied to it.
Id. at 1090 (citation omitted).
44. Justice Scalia so often resorted to the rhetorical strategy of invoking a parade of

1286

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

Wol. 57:1277

[I]t would be foolish to think that "constitutional" rules governing counsel'sbehavior will not be followed by rules governing the
prosecution'sbehavior in the plea-bargaining process that the
Court today announces "is the criminal justice system." Is it
constitutional, for example, for the prosecution to withdraw a
plea offer that has already been accepted? Or to withdraw an
offer before the defense has had adequate time to consider and
accept it? Or to make no plea offer at all, even though its case is
weak-thereby excluding the defendant from "the criminal
justice system"?45

Justice Scalia made no bones about his overarching concern. He
feared that the majority decisions in Lafler and Frye signaled a
"whole new boutique of constitutional jurisprudence ('plea-bargaining law')."46 Here, Stephanos Bibas's rejoinder seems apt: "[lit is
about time the Court developed some plea-bargaining law."47 But beyond plea-bargaining law in general, Justice Scalia also feared this
law would one day apply to prosecutors. Justice Scalia proved prescient with his parade of horribles before, fearing that the Court's
decriminalization of same-sex sex would lead to, horror of all
horrors, same-sex marriage." I,for one, am hoping that he proves
prescient again.
horribles, see, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 388 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting), that it is necessary to
specify his Lafler parade of horribles. For more on Justice Scalia's Lawrence parade of horribles, see Ruth E. Sternglantz, Raining on the Paradeof Horribles:Of Slippery Slopes, Faux
Slopes, and Justice Scalia's Dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1097 (2005);
Michael Dorf, Justice Scalia Was Lucky He Didn't Get the Santorum /Google Treatment, DORF
ON L. (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2012/01/justice-scalia-was.lucky-he-didnt-get.
html [https://perma.cc/J629-34W7].
45. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1392 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
46. Id. at 1398.
47. Bibas, supra note 40, at 35.
48. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (fearing decision would result in invalidation of "laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation,
adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity"); see also Robert Barnes, Scalia Finds His
Predictions on Same-Sex-Marriage Ruling Being Borne Out, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/poitics/scalia-finds-his-predictions-on-same-sex-marriageruling-being-borne-out20131229d2c7b9Oa-7097-1le3-8def-a33011492df2_story.html [https://
perma.cc/J2B3-E37Z].
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II. TURNING TO PROSECUTORS
It may seem strange that thinking about plea-bargaining law
would lead me to thoughts about male-victim rape, but it does. A few
years ago, in an article about male-victim rape, I discussed the related issue of law enforcement officers and prosecutors engaging in
what I characterized as "unjust talk."4 9 Using a hypothetical gangrelated shooting as an illustration, I noted that interrogations often
include language like this: "Shut up and listen! You got one chance
to help yourself and tell us who the shooter is, or you'll be the one in
the big house touching your toes while Bubba and his friends make
you their little bitch, you hear me?"5
Although the discussion in my prior article concerned "unjust
talk" about male-victim rape during interrogations, such "unjust
talk" also occurs during plea negotiations. 1 Such talk is also not
limited to hardened criminals or suspects in crimes of violence." As
I wrote then:
[P]rosecutors and law enforcement officers raise the specter of
male rape in a broad[ ] range of cases. The specter of male rape
is invoked in securities cases as casually as in drug distribution
cases, in mail and wire fraud cases as casually as in racketeering
cases. The prospect of a date with "Bubba" is leveled at poor
defendants and wealthy defendants, minority defendants and
nonminority defendants.6 3
In short, the reference to male-victim rape is often part of the unjust
talk that accompanies plea negotiations. As I wrote back then,

49. Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REv. 1259, 1278 (2011).
50. Id. at 1285. Richard Leo has also described a similar threat. See RICHARD A. LEO,
POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 204-05 (2008) (describing an interview in
which detectives told the suspect he would be raped by a big black man if he did not
cooperate).
51. See Capers, supra note 49, at 1287.
52. See id. at 1285-86.
53. Id. at 1285 (footnotes omitted).
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"[s]uch talk occurs so frequently that it is often taken as a given." 4
Or as a joke.5 5
Bill Stuntz and other scholars have described plea negotiation as
contract.56 The language of contract, to my mind at least, suggests
men in suits, speaking at arm's length. Indeed, Stuntz writes, 'The
parties to these settlements trade various risks and entitlements:
the defendant relinquishes the right to go to trial (along with any
chance of acquittal), while the prosecutor gives up the entitlement
to seek the highest sentence or pursue the most serious charges possible."5 7 But plea negotiation-in the real world, at least-is also
akin to sport.5" And as in other sports, there is plenty of unjust talk,
or what here might be more accurately described as trash talk.
What other trash talk is included in plea negotiations? I am tempted to call this "confessions of a former federal prosecutor." Instead,

54. Id. at 1286. For a rare example of a defendant challenging his confession based on the
use of such tactics, see Tennessee v. Campbell, No. E2014-00697-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim.
App. Oct. 20,2015), https://assets.documentcloud.orgdocuments/2472080/ruling-on-the-admis
sibility-of-a-confession.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5UH-LFHG]. During his interrogation, which
was recorded, investigators repeatedly told the defendant that he would be sent to prison
where he would be repeatedly raped if he did not confess to the crime. See id. at 8. For
example, an investigator told him: "And brother they gonna rape you, they gonna f--king rape
you. You are not a big man; you cannot fend them off. They will f--king rape you daily." Id. at
12. Although the appellate court agreed that such tactics were coercive, the court declined to
find that they rendered the defendant's confession involuntary. See id. at 19-20.
55. One recent example is the coverage given to former Subway spokesperson Jared Fogle
following his guilty plea to child pornography charges. The headline from the New York Post
read: "Subway Jared Underage Sex Shock: Enjoy a Foot Long in Jail." See Andres Jauregui,
New York Post to JaredFogle: 'Enjoy a Foot Long in Jail',HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 20, 2015,
11:29 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/jared-fogle-new-york-post_55d5dfc9e4bO7ad
dcb45a654 [https://perma.cc/2PHH-HZCG]. For other examples, see Capers, supra note 49,
at 1262 n.20.
56. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 1912-13; cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, CriminalProcedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 297-98 (1983) (describing plea bargaining
as a market system component); Frank H. Easterbrook, PleaBargainingas Compromise, 101
YALE L.J. 1969, 1973 (1992) (describing plea bargaining as compromise). Cases have also
emphasized the contractual aspects of plea bargaining. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (analyzing promises of prosecutors as "consideration" for guilty pleas,
and, thus, contractually binding).
57. Scott & Stuntz, supranote 20, at 1909.
58. Usually such analogies are used to describe trials. See, e.g., McFarland v. Scott, 512
U.S. 1256, 1264 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("The trial is the
main event in this system, where the prosecution and the defense do battle to reach a presumptively reliable result."). But they can also describe pretrial practice, including plea
negotiations.
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let us just say that what follows is a sampling of some of the trash
talk that I witnessed as a federal prosecutor.
Look, right now you're the one that's been indicted. But do you
know how easy it is to charge someone else with aidingand abetting or to charge them as a co-conspirator?Let me explain how
easy it is provingaccomplice liability.Right now I'm just looking
at you, but obviously if this case doesn'tplead out soon, I'll have
an incentive to broaden the grandjury's investigation. I mean,
how do I know your wife/husband/mom/pops/son/daughterl
hood rat girlfriend did not place a phone call for you? You understand what I mean? 9
This offer is like fish. It's only going to last for a little while.
And then it changes. It goes bad. It just keeps getting worse and
worse. You know how sometimes the smell gets so bad you can't
breathe? That's where this offer is going.
I'd hate to have to add charges, but obviously if we can't reach
some kind of disposition soon, that will be the next step. You see
this chargingbook I have. It's filled with crimes for me to charge
people with. I especially like the crimes that come with mandatory minimum sentences.60
Think about your children.Think about your elderly mother.
And whether you want to see them again.
Obviously, if we can reach a plea deal early, I will be more
open to a bailpackageto allow your client to remainfree pending
sentencing, which of course will impact whether the Bureau of
59. Gregory Gilchrist, a former public defender, describes a similar story. See Gregory M.
Gilchrist, Counsel's Role in Bargainingfor Trials,99 IOWA L. REV. 1979, 1986 (2014) (describing a prosecutor's offer to not subpoena the defendant's daughter before the grand jury if he
pleaded guilty). Furthermore, at least one court has suggested that it does not violate due
process to offer leniency for a defendant's spouse in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea.
See United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
60. As a federal judge in Brooklyn recently observed, "prosecutors routinely threaten
ultraharsh, enhanced mandatory sentences that no one-not even the prosecutors themselves-thinks are appropriate." Erik Eckholm, ProsecutorsDraw Fire for Sentences Called
Harsh,N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com2013/12/06/us/federal-prosecutorsassailed-in-outcry-over-sentencing.html?j r- [https://perma.cc/YM97-E6VV] (quoting the
Honorable John Gleeson). The judge added that the prosecution "coerces guilty pleas and
produces sentences so excessively severe they take your breath away." Id,

1290

WILLIAM &MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1277

Prisonsconsidershim a low-risk prisoneror a high-riskprisoner
and what facility he will be housed in.
I'm having a one-week sale. Sign a plea agreement this week
and you'll get our deepest discount. But the deal expires this
week.
You want to plead? You want a plea offer from me? Actually,
I think this would be a great case to take to trial.

Quite simply, it was not uncommon, at least when I was a federal prosecutor, to base plea offers on self-interest; to offer pleas that
were meant to be coercive; and, in some cases, not to offer pleas at
all (for example, in cases that would make a fun or prestige-enhancing trial).6 Sometimes prosecutors engaged in these discussions at
the initial appearance, capitalizing on the fact that the defense was
unlikely, at this juncture, to have had an opportunity to investigate
the allegations or have anything more than a cursory interview
with his client. Rather than the first substantive meeting between
defense counsel and client being one to discuss the charges and
perhaps uncover weaknesses in the government's case, in these situations, the first meeting would become one about the offer on the
table and when that offer would expire." Other times, offers might
61. Steven Schulhofer makes a similar point in his discussion of agency costs:
The real parties in interest (the public and the defendant) are represented by
agents (the prosecutor and the defense attorney) whose goals are far from
congruent with those of their principals. There is, accordingly, a potential for
conflicts of interest or, in the language of economics, a problem of agency costs.
The proposition that a mutually agreed-upon exchange presumptively enhances
the welfare of both parties collapses, absent reason to believe that the agents are
acting in the interest of their principals.
[For example, a trial prosecutor's goal may be to] maximize his own welfare,
which is defined by some combination of career advancement job satisfaction,
and leisure.
Stephen J. Schulhofer, PleaBargainingas Disaster,101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1987-88 (1992); see
also Alafair S. Burke, ProsecutorialPassion,Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining,91 MARQ.
L. REv. 183, 188 (2007) ("They care not only about how many cases they win, but also which
cases they win and how they are won.').
62. Bill Stuntz made a similar observation:
Most cases are disposed of by means that seem scandalously casual: a quick
conversation in a prosecutor's office or a courthouse hallway between attorneys
familiar with only the basics of the case, with no witnesses present, leading to
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be discussed during initial pretrial appearances. The goal was to
move cases along the conveyor belt, to get rid of the "dogs" (typically,
the uninteresting or problematic cases) quickly so that more time
could be spent on the cases a prosecutor liked and wanted to take to
trial.6 3 The goal, too, was to try to have particular conversations
while the defendant himself was in earshot. The prosecutor would
speak to the defense counsel, but the intended audience was the
defendant sitting a few feet away so that he would know you meant
business. Indeed, for "stubborn" defendants, we would occasionally
arrange what we termed "reverse proffers," where prosecutors would
meet with defense counsel and a defendant on a particular case and
do a "show and tell," laying out all the reasons why the defendant
should plead. And lay them out we did. And defense counsel, during
these "reverse proffers," were often our willing accomplices, though
they might not put it that way.64 Whether we were playing the good
cop or the bad cop-it really did not matter who was playing which
role-we had the same objective: plead the case out.
And of course, this is only a sampling of some of the tactics employed by prosecutors to strong arm a plea. Consider the tactics of
the District Attorney's Office in Queens, New York.6 5 Starting in
2007, the office began a practice of interviewing arrestees during
booking, before they were arraigned and received counsel.6 6 The Assistant District Attorneys delivered this script at the start of these
interviews-in other words, before administering the Miranda
warning:

a proposed resolution that is then "sold" to both the defendant and the judge. To
a large extent, this kind of horse trading determines who goes to jail and for how
long. That is what plea bargaining is.
Scott & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 1911-12 (footnote omitted).
63. Cf. Oren Gazal-Ayal, PartialBan on PleaBargains,27 CARDOZo L.REV. 2295,2297-99
(2006) (observing that prosecutors sometimes use pleas to circumvent trying cases when
defendants have strong defenses or when the defendant has a reasonably good chance of
showing that one of the elements of the offense cannot be proved).
64. Cf. Schulhofer, supra note 61, at 1988-89 (discussing the agency cost to defense
counsel, which may incentivize an attorney to encourage a plea, even when such a plea is not
in her client's best interest). See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role
in Plea Bargaining,84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1180 (1975) (similar); Rachel Barkow, Institutional
Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV.
869, 879-80, 879 n.43 (2009) (similar).
65. See generally People v. Dunbar, 24 N.Y.3d 304 (2014).
66. See id. at 308.
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If you have an alibi, give me as much information as you can,
including the names of any people you were with.
If your version of what happened is different from what we've
been told, this is your opportunity to tell us your story.
If there is something you need us to investigate about this case
you have to tell us now so we can look into it.
Even if you have already spoken to someone else you do not have
to talk to us.
This will be your only opportunity to speak with us before you go
to court on these charges.67
Only after this script would the prosecutor advise the defendant
of her Miranda rights and seek a waiver.6" The clear, if unstated,
goal of the script was to "neutralize[]"69 Miranda and to secure a
plea and/or cooperation. The script was such a valuable prosecutorial tool that when a trial judge questioned the ethics of the process,
the Queens District Attorney filed a suit to silence the judge.7" It
took an appellate court to bar the practice, though even afterwards
the Queen's District Attorney appealed the decision.71
Also consider, more generally, the ability of prosecutors to simply
refuse to plead cases to lesser sentences, including death penalty
cases in which defendants are willing to plead to life without the
possibility of parole. One of the most well-known cases is that of
James Holmes, accused of killing twelve people and wounding another fifty-eight at a movie theater in Aurora, Colorado in 2012.72
Colorado prosecutors rejected his offer to plead guilty to life in
prison without the possibility of parole.7 3 Another is the case of
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, convicted and sentenced to death in connection

67. Id. at 309 (emphasis added).
68. See id. at 310.
69. Id. at 316.
70. See John Eligon, Suit Seeks to Silence Queens Judge on Interview Tactic, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 31, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/01/nyregion/Olqueensda.html?_r=O [https:I
perma.cc/C464-VER3].
71. See Dunbar,24 N.Y.3d at 311 (affirming appellate court's decision).
72. See Carol McKinley & Christina Ng, Colorado Shooter James Holmes' Guilty Plea
Offer Rejected, ABC NEWS (Mar. 29, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/IUSljames-holmes-guiltyplea-offer-rejected-aurora-moviestory?id=18839143 [https:lperma.ccIH4R8-C5ZM].
73. Id.
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with the Boston Marathon bombing.74 Prosecutors in that case also
declined to offer a plea to life without parole.7 5 But Holmes and
Tsarnaev are not alone. In New Hampshire, Michael Addison was
sentenced to death after prosecutors rejected his offer to plead guilty
to life without parole.76 Indeed, when I prosecuted capital cases in
the Southern District of New York, we also rejected offers to plead
to life without parole.
There is at least one more aspect of the prosecutor's role in plea
bargaining-and the lack of oversight-that deserves attention: plea
bargaining is surely tainted by legally inappropriate considerations.
Here, Justice Kennedy's channeling of Stephanos Bibas comes to
mind: "The expected post-trial sentence is imposed in only a few
percent of cases. It is like the sticker price for cars: only an ignorant,
ill-advised consumer would view full price as the norm and anything
less as a bargain."7 This quote suggests two distinct problems: a
trial penalty out of sync with just desert or any utilitarian purpose,
and characteristics that may disadvantage a defendant's ability to
intelligently evaluate a plea offer.
However, a third problem lies just below the surface. Sticking
with the car analogy, we know that sellers bargain less with outside groups such as racial minorities, and more with those who
they think can afford it.78 Something very similar happens on the
74. See Milton J. Valencia, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Gets Death Penalty for PlacingMarathon
Bomb, BOST. GLOBE (May 15,2015), https://www.bostonglobe.comlmetro/2015/05/15dzhokhartsarnaev-death-penalty-sentencing-jury-boston-marathon-bombingtcanMEfLme QJxQ4rFU0s
ERJ/story.html [https:Hlperma.cc/D555-WL3E].
75. See Tovia Smith, Many Question Lack of Plea Deal in Boston Bombing Case, NPR
(Mar. 5,2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/03/05/391041957/many-question-lack-of-plea-deal-inboston-bombing-case [https://perma.cc/T4FU-J5E8].
76. Lincoln Caplan, End the Death Penalty in New Hampshire,N.Y. TIMEs: TAKING NOTE
(Nov. 14, 2012, 11:54 AM), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/14/end-the-deathpenalty-in-new-hampshire/?_r=0 [https://perma.cd/3VBS-SUKT].
77. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012) (quoting Stephanos Bibas, Regulating
the Plea-BargainingMarket: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection,99 CALIF. L. REV.
1117, 1138 (2011)).
78. See Derek Thompson, The Price is Racist: When Minorities (and Women) Are Asked to
Pay More, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (June 24, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.comfbusiness/archive/
2013/06/the-price-is-racist-when-minorities-and-women-are-asked-to-pay-more/277174/ [https://
perma.cc/32HL-7H8F]; see also Stuart Rossman, The Data Is Clear: Auto Lenders Discriminate, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 17, 2015), http:/www.usnews.comlopinion/economicinteiligence/2015/11/17/dont-let-congress-weaken-oversight-of-discriminatory-auto-financing
[https://perma.cc/9N9H-H4BD]. For a seminal article on transaction discrimination, see Ian
Ayres, FairDriving: Gender and Race Discriminationin Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV.
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prosecutor's side in the plea negotiation context. In the shadowy
bazaar of plea bargaining, negotiations that implicitly take into account race, religion, age, and class occur on a daily basis. 79 To be
clear, I am not suggesting that this is done deliberately, but again,
we all have these implicit biases of which we are unaware.8" Prosecutors press tougher pleas on those defendants who they believe
"can afford it"--often poor and minority defendants-while offering
lighter plea deals to those who they believe cannot--often white,
middle-class defendants.8 1 Indeed, these prosecutors may even think
different plea offers based on the perceived softness of the defendant, which itself may be racially coded, is morally right and even
retributively just, given perceptions about how various groups
experience prison" and the perceived risks of prison victimization. 3
L. REV. 817 (1991).
79. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF AN AMERICAN PROSECUTOR
(2009) (discussing race and class bias); Angela J. Davis, Prosecutionand Race: The Powerand
Privilege of Discretion,67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 15, 41 (1998) (discussing bias based on "race,
religion, or some other arbitrary classification").
80. Using implicit association tests (IATs), which measure the speed with which an
individual associates a categorical status with a characteristic, social cognition researchers
have shown that implicit biases continue to be widespread, even among those who consider
themselves to be unbiased. See Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism,Outgroup
Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOc. JUST. RES. 143, 146 (2004). Such
implicit biases inform all of our interactions and have particular implications with respect to
criminal justice issues. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 150304 (2005); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1135-39
(2012); L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the FourthAmendment, 95 MINN. L. REV.
2035, 2038-40 (2011); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, InterrogatingRacial Violence,
12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 115, 120-21 (2014).
81. An analysis conducted by the Vera Institute in partnership with the New York County
District Attorney's Office pointed to the continued salience of race in plea bargaining. For
example, the study found that for misdemeanor drug cases, black defendants were 27 percent,
and Latino defendants 18 percent, more likely to receive plea offers that included a custodial
sentence than similarly situated white defendants. BESIKI KUTATELADZE ET AL., VERA INST.
OF JUSTICE, RACE AND PROSECUTION IN MANHATTAN (2014), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/
files/resources/downloads/race-and-prosecution-manhattan-summary.pdff[https://perma.cc7M
P3-RLEX]; see also James C. McKinley, Study Finds Race Disparityin CriminalProsecutions,
N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/nyregion/09race.html?-r=O [ht
tps://perma.cc/MRT5-VVZC].
82. See Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
182, 194-95 (2009). In fact, even interviews with judges suggest that many judges assume
white-collar defendants experience incarceration differently than other defendants, and the
judges take this into account when imposing sentences. See STANTONWHEELER ETAL., SITTING
IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE COLLAR CRIMINALS 144-51 (1988).
83. See generally Capers, supra note 49. Indeed, the Court arguably gave its blessing to
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The point here is not to offer an apologia.Rather, the point is to
bring to light how unregulated prosecutors are when it comes to
plea negotiations. And it is to ask whether any value exists in the
right to have defense counsel communicate plea offers if the prosecutor need not offer a plea at all. And what value is the right to have
defense counsel provide effective advice regarding the merits vel non
of a plea offer when the prosecution has complete discretion to time
such an offer, or condition such an offer, in a way that impedes
informed decision making? What value is that right when the
prosecution, or its law enforcement proxy, has already tainted the
right by speaking to the defendant first, coloring the defendant's
perception of his options? While the Court is now giving teeth to the
Sixth Amendment's "right to counsel" clause-such that Justice
Scalia feared the majority was on the brink of creating "plea-bargaining law"-should not some attention be paid to the counsel on
the other side of the table, that quintessential "officer of the court,"
the counsel for the government?
III. PROSECUTORS, PLEAS, AND DUE PROCESS
It is difficult to imagine extending plea-bargaining law to prosecutors without addressing the vast power prosecutors wield. As former
U.S. Attorney General Robert Jackson once remarked, prosecutors
have "more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other
person in America." 4 Donald Dripps, speaking of the imbalance of
power in plea negotiations, put it bluntly by comparing plea bargaining to a game of "chicken" with locomotives:
[I]magine that the prosecutor's train has a throttle that goes
from 10 to 100 miles per hour, while the defendant's throttle
goes only from 10 to 20. Suppose further that the prosecution's
train is controlled from the caboose, while the defense train is
operated from the locomotive. Recall the formula that kinetic
energy is equal to mass multiplied by velocity squared. As the
engineers communicate by radio, the prosecutor can credibly and
such coded thinking in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), which involved officers in
the Rodney King beating. The Court affirmed a sentencing departure based on "susceptibility
to abuse in prisdn." Id. at 84.
84. Robert H. Jackson, The FederalProsecutor,31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3 (1940).
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asymmetrically threaten to make the collision catastrophic rather than minor."

Dripps then asks us to consider the effect of this power in just one
case, Graham v. Florida,in which the Court ruled that a sentence
of life without parole for a juvenile offender violated the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause."6 Following
Graham's armed burglary with assault, he agreed to plead guilty
and receive three years' probation to avoid a threatened life
sentence, but Graham then violated the terms of his probation and
was resentenced to life. 7 Reviewing the reason for Graham's life
sentence, Dripps asks: "Which ... is more Kafkaesque, the legal
doctrine that labels [Graham's original] plea voluntary, or the
premise that life without parole and three years of probation are
both outcomes consistent with the interests of justice?"8 8
The prosecutor's outsized power is attributable in part to his
almost unfettered discretion, which of course goes beyond the plea
bargaining stage. 9 But his power is also attributable to the Court's
hands-off approach. Even when confronted with some of the more
troubling aspects of prosecutorial discretion-as in McClesky v.
Kemp, in which there was uncontroverted evidence of widespread
85. Donald A. Dripps, Reinventing Plea Bargaining56 (Robina Inst. of Criminal Law &
Criminal Justice, Working Paper No. 5, 2014), http:www.robinainstitute.org/wp-content/up
loads/5_Dripps.pdf [https://perma.cc/3E37-NNWH].
86. See 560 U.S. 48, 81-82 (2010).
87. See id. at 54-57.
88. Dripps, supra note 85, at 58. Of course, there are many stories like this. Consider the
facts underlying Bordenkircher v. Hayes 434 U.S. 357 (1978). Paul Hayes forged a check in
the amount of $88.30 and was offered a plea that would have capped his sentence at five
years. Id. at 358. The prosecutor threatened to seek mandatory life under the state's threestrikes law if Hayes declined. Id. at 358-59. Hayes rejected the plea offer, and the prosecutor
carried through on his threat. Id. at 359. The Court upheld the life sentence, finding no due
process violation in the actions of the prosecutor. Id. at 365.
89. See DAVIS, supra note 79, at 126-27, 140-41. One of the clearest examples of this
discretion arose out of the riots at the Attica Correctional Facility in 1971. As guards were
ostensibly taking steps to regain control of the prison, they retaliated by killing several prisoners and continued to assault and beat prisoners after regaining control. When federal and
state prosecutors declined to pursue charges against the guards, prisoners and family members sued. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the claims, citing the discretionary
power of prosecutors. See Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 376,
379 (2d Cir. 1973). For a historical perspective on this discretionary power, see Carolyn B.
Ramsey, The DiscretionaryPower of "Public"Prosecutors in HistoricalPerspective, 39 AM.
CIM. L. REV. 1309 (2002).
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racial discrimination in the selection of capital defendants;9 0 in
Ewing v. California,involving discretion in charging defendants
under a three-strikes law;9 and in United States v. Armstrong,
involving a question of selective prosecutions 9 2-the Court has
shrugged, looked the other way, or punted. Never mind that this
discretion is on par with the very discretion the Court has frowned
upon with respect to police officers.9 3
There is something else to be said about the source of the prosecutor's power: Once upon a time we emphasized the justness of
prosecutors. As the Court stated in 1935 in Berger v. United States,
the interest of the prosecutor "is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done.... It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it
is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one." 94 Now,
we are more likely to insist that prosecutors be zealous advocates in
a criminal justice system that is adversarial by design.95 Perhaps it
is no wonder that Paul Butler has asked, "Should good people be
prosecutors?"9' 6 The system has leaned away from doing justice to
maximizing convictions.
I do not mean to overstate the problem. Although the Sixth
Amendment may have little to say about how prosecutors engage in
plea negotiations, the Due Process Clause does provide some limits.
But in the modern era, the Court's use of the Due Process Clause to
rein in prosecutors has been thin indeed. In Santobello v. New York,
the Court read the Due Process Clause as barring a prosecutor from
tricking a defendant into pleading guilty, and also held that, once a
binding plea agreement has been entered into, prosecutors may not
renege on their promises.97 But beyond this limitation, prosecutors
90. See 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987).
91. See 538 U.S. 11, 17 (2003).
92. See 517 U.S. 456, 461 (1996).
93. The Court has been particularly concerned about police discretion in the context of
special needs searches and seizures, such as automobile checkpoints. See, e.g., Illinois v.
Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423-25 (2004); Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451-52
(1990); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-55 (1979).
94. 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
95. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853,862 (1975) ("The very premise of our adversary
system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote
the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free.").
96. PAUL BUTLER, LET'S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 101, 261-62 (2009).
97. See 404 U.S. 257 (1971),
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are largely unregulated. Certainly this is true regarding the use of
threats to bring additional charges in order to induce a plea; that is
essentially what the Court held in Bordenkircherv. Hayes.9" Indeed,
even prosecutors' Bradyobligation to disclose "material" exculpatory
evidence99 is only shoddily enforced,'0 0 and barely enforced at all in
connection with plea bargains, ml some of which require defendants
to waive their right to exculpatory material. 1 2 Although Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 410 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence provide some regulation, the former
primarily applies to findings a court must make before accepting a
plea as voluntary,0 3 and the latter primarily applies to how a prosecutor can use statements made during plea negotiations at trial." 4
Even less effective are professional conduct rules. The American Bar
Association (ABA) Standards provide that prosecutors should have
a general policy to consult with defense counsel concerning pleas,
should not make false statements during plea negotiations, and
should comply with any plea agreements entered into. 0 5 And the
ABA Model Rules bar prosecutors from engaging in dishonest
conduct or "conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice."'0 ° But these regulations are thin, to put it generously. And
they are rarely enforced in the plea negotiation context.'0 7 As Bibas
98. See 434 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1978). For a discussion of Bordenkircher as a missed
opportunity, see William Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: The Rise of Plea Bargainingand
the Decline of the Rule of Law (Harvard Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 120, 2005), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=854284 [https://perma.cc/3M9V-APNA].
99. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
100. See, e.g., Connick v. Thomspon, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). For an interesting proposal to
remedy Brady's shortcomings, see Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(2015).
101. See Michael Nasser Petegorsky, Note, Plea Bargaining in the Dark: The Duty to
Disclose Exculpatory Brady Evidence During Plea Negotiations, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3599
(2013); cf. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (holding that due process does not
require prosecutors to disclose impeachment evidence in advance of a guilty plea).
102. See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633; see also 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 586 (4th ed. 2015) ("A term in a plea agreement waiving any right to Brady
disclosure as part of a plea bargain is enforceable.").
103. FED. R. CRIM.P. 11.
104. FED. R. EVID. 410.
105. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION §§ 3-4.1 to 3-4.2
(AM. BAR ASS'N 2014).
106. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015).
107. See Fred C. Zacharias, The ProfessionalDisciplineof Prosecutors,79 N.C. L. REV. 721,
735 (2001).
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has observed, "a $100 credit-card purchase of a microwave oven is
regulated more carefully than a guilty plea that results in years of
imprisonment."10 8
But it does not have to be. Consider again the Due Process Clause.
Every student of criminal procedure knows that the Court did not
always read the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause as
merely incorporating the Bill of Rights (and thus turning those
rights into a national "code of criminal procedure"0 9). During the
1940s, the Court read the Due Process Clause as having "an
independent potency,"' 0 as prohibiting government "conduct that
shocks the conscience,""' and as requiring processes "essential to a
[and] fundamental to the American scheme of justice."' 2
fair trial ....
Consider some of the cases decided under the Court's "fundamental fairness" approach. In Strauder v. West Virginia, the Court
relied on fundamental fairness to invalidate the conviction of a
black defendant when state law limited jury service to "white male
persons.""' 3 In Powell v. Alabama, the Court reached the same
conclusion to vacate the conviction of black youths accused of gangraping two white women and sentenced by an all-white jury to
death," 4' when "no lawyer had been named or definitely designated
to represent the defendants" until the actual morning of trial." 5 The
Court again relied on due process and its requirement of fundamental fairness to intervene in Norris v. Alabama, when blacks were
systematically excluded from the jury pool." 6 In its first confession
case, Brown v. Mississippi, the Court held that the conviction and
death sentence of three black sharecroppers accused of murdering
108. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea BargainingMarket: From Caveat Emptor to
Consumer Protection,99 CAJIF. L. REv. 1117, 1153 (2011).
109. Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure,53 CALIF. L.
REV. 929, 954 (1965).
110. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 66 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
111. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
112. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
113. 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879).
114. See 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) ("[T]he failure of the trial court to give [the defendants]
reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel was a clear denial of due process."). This
case, perhaps more than any other during the early criminal procedure era, signaled the
beginning of the Court's heightened sensitivity to the treatment of African Americans in the
criminal justice system.
115. Id. at 56.
116. See 294 U.S. 587, 589-90 (1935).
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their white landlord based on confessions obtained by torture offended due process." 7 And in Walker v. Johnson, the Court invoked
notions of fundamental fairness to hold that a plea secured by
coercion or deceit from the prosecutor violates due process."'
Part of what motivated the Court in these early "fundamental
fairness" cases was the imbalance of power between prosecutors and
defendants." 9 The Court thus read the Due Process Clause as
capacious, and as a catch-all right to protect the innocent as well as
the guilty, to ensure accuracy, to level the playing field, and even to
further the goal of racial equality. To be sure, by the 1960s, the
Court had pivoted from this broad reliance on "fundamental fairness" and turned instead to specific provisions of the Bill of Rights
to address claims. Much was lost with this change. Tracey Meares
reminds us:
Throughout the early due process cases comprising the infancy
of constitutional criminal procedure, the Court demonstrated not
only an interest in securing accurate determinations of guilt for
state criminal defendants, but also an obvious concern about the
relationship between the structure of criminal courts and the
social and political legitimacy of American democracy.... While
such public-regarding aspects of justice have not been disregarded as irrelevant to criminal procedure decisions following
Gideon, they occupy a much less pronounced role. Instead, the
later decisions reflect the impact of a jurisprudence that focuses
its attention on the individual offender and his relationship to
the Bill of Rights, often to the exclusion of the public's perception
of the fairness of the criminal justice system's operation. 2 °
But just because much was lost, that loss does not have to be
irretrievable. This is a push for a revitalization of due process. Is
there any reason to doubt that, at a minimum, a baseline of fundamental fairness-if taken seriously-would mean that prosecutors
117. See 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936). For more on the story behind Brown v. Mississippi,
see RICHARD C. CORTNER, A "SCOTTSBORO" CASE IN MissiSsipPi: THE SUPREME COURT AND
BROWN V. MISSISSIPPI (1986).

118. See 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941).
119. The Court was also concerned with what Tracey Meares calls a "public-regarding
notion of due process," namely a concern that the public view the criminal justice system as
fair. See Tracey L. Meares, What's Wrong with Gideon, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 215, 219-20 (2003).
120. Id. at 215-16.
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should not be able to use the threat of additional charges against a
defendant or a defendant's family member to induce a plea, at least
when the fulfillment of that threat cannot be justified either on
retributive or non-perverse utilitarian grounds? 21' Or that prosecutors should not be able to use the specter of prison rape as a
negotiating tool?122 Indeed, that there is something fundamentally
unfair, in perhaps all but the most extreme cases, in rejecting an
offer to plead to life without parole? In sum, is there any reason to
doubt, as we think about "plea-bargaining law," that such law
should also include more oversight over prosecutors during the pleabargaining stage?
Consider two early cases, both decided under the Due Process
Clause. In Rogers v. Richmond, the defendant agreed to confess to
a murder charge only after the police threatened "to bring in his
wife for questioning" and have her "taken into custody."'23 For the
Court, it was immaterial that the confession may have been truthful.124 The issue was that the government's threat to investigate his
wife for wrongdoing in order to secure a confession could mean that
the confession was the result of coercion, violating due process.125
Certainly the same could be said of the practice, common among
prosecutors today, to exact
pleas by threatening to investigate sus26
pects' family members.'
121. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything
Is a Crime, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 102, 104 (2013) http://columbialawreview.orgtwpcontent/uploads/2013/07Reynolds- 113-Colum.-L.-Rev.-Sidebar-102.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4
4A-A2QJ] (observing that "everyone is a criminal if prosecutors look hard enough").
122. Such references would seem to be prohibited, as I have argued previously. See Capers,
supra note 49, at 1287 (relying on Arizona v. Fulminante,499 U.S. 279 (1991)). And yet such
references are so common that they are not even confined to the shadowy corners of the courthouse. These references are made out loud. The statements the former California Attorney
General made about Enron CEO Kenneth Lay are but one example. The Attorney General
said, "I would love to personally escort [Lay] to an 8-by-10 cell that he could share with a
tattooed dude who says, 'Hi, my name is Spike, honey."' Michael Barone, Bill Lockyer Is
CaliforniaDreaming, WASH. EXAMINER (May 13, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.washington
examiner.comi/opinion/blogsfbeltway-confidential/Bill-Lockyer-is-California- dreaming- 135
954.html [https://perma.ccY8L4-BVRY].
123. 365 U.S. 534, 535 (1961).
124. See id. at 540-43.
125. See id. at 548-49.
126. The Court, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, seemed open to considering whether this
practice violated due process. The Court noted, "This case does not involve the constitutional
implications of a prosecutor's offer during plea bargaining of adverse or lenient treatment for
some person other than the accused[,] ...
which might pose a greater danger of inducing a false
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Machibrodav. United States is another expansive case. 127 In that
case, the petitioner alleged that he had pleaded guilty because the
prosecutor had made promises about the length of the sentence he
would receive and told him "if he 'insisted in making a scene,' certain unsettled matters concerning two other robberies would be
added to the petitioner's difficulties. 128 In remanding the case, the
Court made clear that if the petitioner's allegations were true, he
would be entitled to have his sentence vacated.1 29 "A ... plea, if
induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the character of
a voluntary act, is void." 3° The threat of additional charges, which
the Court found potentially troubling in Machibroda,is certainly on
par with the type of threats prosecutors routinely make today.
Of course, the likely response is that the Warren Court abandoned this "fundamental fairness" approach in favor of selective
incorporation of specific provisions of the Bill of Rights and that the
Roberts Court is unlikely to revive the more capacious concept of
fundamental fairness. I am more sanguine. Although the Court
moved toward selective incorporation, it never disavowed fundamental fairness. Indeed, remnants of a fundamental fairness
approach to due process can be seen in cases such as Holmes v.
South Carolina,reading the Due Process Clause as guaranteeing
criminal defendants "a meaningful opportunity to present a com13 It can be read in the requirement-even
plete defense.""
after
Miranda-thatconfessions in fact be voluntary.132 And it can be
read in the Court's acknowledgment, in Chavez v. Martinez, that a
due process violation can exist independently of any trial right.133
Indeed, although the Court has suggested that the Due Process
Clause has limited operation beyond specific guarantees in the Bill
guilty plea by skewing the assessment of the risks a defendant must consider." 434 U.S. 357,
364 n.8 (1978). Lower courts have been particularly critical of the practice of threatening
prosecution absent probable cause. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491, 497 (10th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Nuckols, 606 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir. 1979). Whether these courts
would be equally critical of threats to investigate is far from certain.
127. See 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
128. Id. at 490.
129. See id. at 493.
130. Id.
131. 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)).
132. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).
133. See 538 U.S. 760 (2003) (essentially finding that a due process claim could be made
even when an individual's wrongfully obtained confession is never used against him at trial).
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of Rights, the Court's record on due process suggests an opening
that is often overlooked. As Jerold Israel reminds us, though rarely
in the foreground, "constitutional regulation through free-standing
'
due process actually extends today to every phase of the process."134
This is true of the investigatory stage, the pretrial stage, the trial
stage, and sentencing.'3 5 And it is true of the plea-bargaining stage.
Indeed, it is at the plea-bargaining stage that "the due process
clause is the dominant source of constitutional regulation. ' '136
Due process establishes the minimum amount of information
that must be given to the defendant prior to accepting his plea,
requires that the record provide a factual basis for the plea
under certain circumstances, determines what pressures can be
imposed upon a defendant without rendering his plea involuntary, determines at what point there exists a plea agreement
which can be "broken," and requires relief for a plea
bargain that
137
has been breached by the prosecutor or court.
Although this is not much, it is a start. Couple that start with the
fact that the Court has been most receptive to due process claims in
the criminal arena when no specific Bill of Rights guarantee covers
a particular criminal procedure,1 38 as is the case with respect to plea
bargaining. All of this leaves an opening for pressing due process
claims. Even if the Court is not initially receptive to these claims,
these arguments should be made. Some years ago, Chief Justice
Roberts dismissed legal scholars as essentially irrelevant. He stated,
"What the academy is doing, as far as I can tell ... is largely of no
use or interest to people who actually practice law. '139 He has also
stated that legal scholarship rarely has done anything "particularly
helpful for practitioners and judges." 4 ' Here is something that
134. Jerold H. Israel, Free-StandingDue Process and Criminal Procedure:The Supreme
Court's Search for InterpretiveGuidelines, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 303, 389 (2001).
135. See id. at 389-95.
136. Id. at 393.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.
266 (1994).
139. Adam Liptak, Keep the Briefs Brief, Literary Justices Advise, N.Y. TIMES (May 20,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/21/us/politics/21court.html?_r=O [https://perma.ec/
4UWY-5LLT] (quoting Chief Justice Roberts).
140. Jess Bravin, Chief Justice Roberts on Obama, Justice Stevens, Law Reviews, More,
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matters and could be helpful: reinvigorate, and take seriously, the
we should not be afraid to
Due Process Clause. And as scholars,
41
pathos.
on
based
arguments
make
And beyond the Due Process Clause-indeed, beyond looking for
constitutional jurisprudence to improve the plea bargaining that "is
the criminal justice system"-1 4 -we must ask ourselves what else
can be done. What benefits might flow from Judge Rakoff's proposal
that we modify the federal system, which currently bars judges from
participating in plea negotiations? Under his proposal, magistrates
would make plea recommendations after hearing the evidence prosecutors intended to offer and the defenses from counsel.' 43 What
benefits might accrue if we take up Rachel Barkow's suggestion of
bifurcating prosecutors' offices, such that adjudicative decisions, like
deciding the terms on which to negotiate a plea, are handled by a
separate team of attorneys than those that handle investigations
and trials,'4 4 a variation of which is working with some success in
Milwaukee?' 4 5 Or the suggestion made by such scholars as Gregory
Gilchrist'4 6 and John Rappaport' 4 7 that we "unbundle" trial rights,
which may have the effect of leveling the plea negotiation field
between the government and the citizen? Or Laura Appleman's
suggestion that we create plea juries? 4 The point here is that this
liminal moment is a time for generating and discussing ideas, and
hopefully this Symposium will spark more.
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Apr. 7, 2010, 7:20 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/04/07/chief-justiceroberts-on-obama-justice-stevens-law-reviews-more [https://perma.cc/RBT2-P3CM].
141. For an important defense of pathetic arguments, see Jamal Greene, PatheticArgument
in ConstitutionalLaw, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1389 (2013).
142. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).
143. See Jed S. Rakoff, Why InnocentPeople PleadGuilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/nov/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/
[https://perma.cc/GC9D-WP5P]. Others have made similar proposals. See Susan R. Klein,
Enhancingthe JudicialRole in CriminalPlea and Sentence Bargaining,84 TEX. L. REV. 2023,
2029 (2006); Anne R. Traum, Using Outcomes to Reframe Guilty PleaAdjudication,66 FLA.
L. REV. 823, 828 (2014).
144. See Barkow, supra note 64, at 897-99.
145. See Jeffrey Toobin, The Milwaukee Experiment, NEW YORKER (May 11, 2015), http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/11/the-milwaukee-experiment [https://perma.cc/HR
49-TEBU].
146. See Gilchrist, supra note 59, at 1981.
147. See John Rappaport, Unbundling Criminal Trial Rights, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 181
(2015).
148. See Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 733 (2010).
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Allow me to go a step further. If federal judges can apply a uniform sentencing discount to those who plead guilty and therefore
demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility for their conduct-I am
thinking here of the uniform three-point plea discount provided under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' 4 9 -then is it really too much to
demand something similar of prosecutors, who now can threaten a
sentence of probation or life imprisonment in the same breath? 5 '
And if a federal judge, when she departs from the heartland of a
normal sentence, must articulate her reasons for doing so, and these
reasons must be reasonable in light of stated sentencing goals and
rationales for punishment,' would it really be too much to demand
something similar of prosecutors, those other "ministers of justice, ' in negotiating pleas?
CONCLUSION

Plea bargaining was not always the criminal justice system.
Indeed, it is of fairly recent vintage. This begs the question: Can we
go back? Here, I agree with Alschuler: "If someone were to propose
a Tea Party (or Back to Basics) Movement for Criminal Justice, I
might still join, but I would not give the group more than ten
dollars. The tide for a crusade to prohibit plea bargaining has
passed."'5 3
That said, we can try to make plea bargaining "less awful." 5' 4 The
goal of this Article has been to think of ways to do just that by
thinking about the other side of Lafler and Frye: imposing some
oversight on how prosecutors negotiate pleas. Part of my argument
is predicated on reinvigorating the Due Process Clause such that we
ask what kind of plea offers are fundamentally unfair. It would be
149. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014).
150. This is not an extreme example. It was the plea threat that was made in Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). In Bordenkircherv. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), it was five years
or life imprisonment. As a former federal prosecutor, I can say that such extreme threats are
frequently made.
151. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014).
152. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF 'L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015) (describing
prosecutors as having "the responsibility of a minister of justice").
153. Alschuler, supranote 14, at 706 (citation omitted). I tend to be a little bit more generous, so I would probably give $100.
154. Albert W. Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The Selective
Morality of ProfessorBibas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1412, 1423 (2003).
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foolhardy to hope, at this late point in the game, that the Court
would hold that plea bargaining itself violates due process, though
a panel of the Fifth Circuit did just that briefly in 1957.15 Although
the rhetoric of that Fifth Circuit case holds appeal-"Justice and liberty are not the subjects of bargaining and barter"' 5 6-that ship has
sailed. Beyond that, it is not plea bargaining that is the problem but
the unequal bargaining power between the parties and the absence
of meaningful regulation. 5 7 Hopefully a newly reinvigorated Due
Process Clause can provide some of this regulation. If not, maybe
changing the culture of prosecutors' offices can. What is certain is
this: For those of us who do not shy away from the "pursuit of
perfect justice, 15 s something must be done. When the plea system
means that legally innocent defendants are compelled to plead,
when the current system forces defendants, both innocent and
guilty, to "choose between Satan and Lucifer,"' 5 9 something must be
done.
But as we think about making plea bargaining "less awful," let us
not lose sight of other issues. And let us not forget how interconnected, how networked, 160 every aspect of our criminal justice system is.
Plea bargaining, let us not forget, is just one aspect of a criminal
justice system that, for too many, "has run off the rails., 16 ' Let me
put this another way: It is important to study and understand trees.
But let us not lose sight that there is a forest to contend with.
Just consider the following:
We live in a country that, between 1970 and 2005, increased its
prison population by 628%. We live in a country where one in
every one hundred persons is behind bars, where our prisons
155. See Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1957),judgment set asideen banc,
246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd per curiam, 356 U.S. 26 (1958).
156. Id. at 113.
157. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 1964.
158. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1391 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. Daniel Beekman, Judge Jed Rakoff Says Plea-DealProcess Is Broken, Offers Solution, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 27, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/judge-pleadeal-process-fixed-article-1.1806358 [https://perma.cc/VTA2-XTCK] (quoting Judge Rakoff).
160. For a discussion of network theory, see Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, Our
CriminalNetwork, and The Wire, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRiM.L. 459, 468-69 (2011).
161. WILLIAM J. STU-NTz, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 5 (2011); cf.

Alschuler, supra note 14, at 706 (describing the criminal justice system as having "gone off
the tracks, and the rails themselves have disappeared").
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and jails now hold about 2.4 million individuals. This is more
than the population of New Hampshire, more than the population of Wyoming, more than the population of Vermont. Part of
this increase is attributable to the war on drugs, to be sure, but
part is surely attributable to our turn to longer and longer
sentences, including life without parole and de facto life.
Consider more numbers. Since 1992 and 2009, the number of
prisoners serving [life without parole] sentences has risen from
about 12,400 to 41,000, an increase of more than 300%. The
number of prisoners serving life sentences is more staggering.
As of 2009,
one in every eleven prisoners was serving a life
62
sentence. 1

At the same time, we are seeing staggering increases in misdemeanor prosecutions. 6 3 Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that our
current state
of mass incarceration is largely attributable to pros164
ecutors.
So maybe, in this time of falling crime rates and of relative
repose, as we think about the import of Lafler and Frye, as we think
about next steps, we should also think about how our steps fit in
with the larger goal of fixing the system. For some, one way to improve the system would be for public defenders, already overworked
and underfunded, to say "no more"-to reject all plea offers and to
force the government to meet its burden of proving every material
element beyond a reasonable doubt at trial in every case. Michelle
166
Alexander has suggested this solution,165 as has Jenny Roberts.
My concern is that there would be backlash.'67 This is what I mean
162. 1. Bennett Capers, Defending Life, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA'S NEW DFATH
PENALTY? 163, 179 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2012).
163. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (2012); Jenny
Roberts, Crashingthe Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1090 (2013).
164. See John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of PrisonGrowth, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
1239, 1242, 1245, 1250, 1253 (2012).
165. See Michelle Alexander, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2O12/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justicesystem.html [https://perma.c/2CU7.DDE5];see also Albert Alschuler, PleaBargainingand
Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 38 (1979).
166. See Roberts, supra note 163, at 1129.
167. It is telling that when Legal Aid in New York attempted to exert some power in the
1990s, then-mayor Rudy Guiliani responded by attempting to defund Legal Aid. See Jane
Fritsch & David Rohde, Legal Aid's Last Challenge from an Old Adversary, Guiliani,N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 9,2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/O9/09/nyregion/legal-aid-s-last-challenge
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by things being interconnected. If public defenders attempted to
crash the system by taking all cases to trial, I do not doubt legislators might respond by making the trial penalty even more draconian
than it already is. So how about this as a friendly amendment:
instead of crashing the system, maybe a "slow-down" instead. Plea
bargaining, after all, "provides a means by which prosecutors can
obtain a larger net return from criminal convictions, holding resources constant." ' A "slow-down" would reduce the prosecutor's
return while increasing resources. It would shift the balance of
power. Imagine what would happen if each year each public
defender took two more cases to trial. Maybe the plea rate would
drop from 97 percent, to 94 percent, or 91 percent. And then lower
still. What would be the collateral consequences of that? 6 9 If
prosecutors had to devote more resources to trials, would they
reduce the number of cases they indict? Would they prioritize cases
in such a way as to pursue cases for which punishment is really
deserved?
What else? Years ago, I publicly debated Paul Butler on the topic
of whether good people should be prosecutors. I still believe that
prosecutors can do good. So maybe, since it is the prosecutor's turn,
it is time for more prosecutors to do good, and be good. Imagine
prosecutorial culture that no longer rewards harsh penalties but
instead rewards just penalties. Imagine a prosecutor's office that
says no to strong-arming pleas by threatening to pursue cases
against family members. And imagine a prosecutor's office deciding,
in the face of a defense motion based on due process, on fundamental fairness, to decline to oppose the motion. That is what I am
hoping for. Ah, hope.

from-an-old-adversary-giuliani.html [https://perma.cc/Z4V4-T783].
168. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 1915.
169. To be sure, this raises ethical considerations in determining which cases to take to
trial. Considering that many defendants may want to go to trial, however, this concern is not
insurmountable.

